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This paper theoretically studies the consequences of unobservable het-
erogeneity on self-governance and cooperation in large communities. I con-
sider a game model where players belong to a large population and are ran-
domly matched. Players interact with each other infrequently and, when
matched, play a prisoners’ dilemma. There exists an institution that can
convey information on play histories. Players’ payoff functions differ, so
that some players have a higher tendency towards cooperation. This con-
stitutes the main modeling innovation of this work and makes the model a
mixed adverse selection-moral hazard model.
A suitable equilibrium concept is introduced and characterized. Some
novel comparative statics results are obtained; showing in particular that
more heterogeneous societies may sustain more cooperation. Decentraliza-
tion and stability analyses are carried out. Private enforcement mechanisms
are explored, showing conditions under which private intermediation leads
to Pareto optimal cooperation. Applications and examples are explored.
JEL classification numbers: C73, D40, B25




This paper studies self-governance through repeated interaction in heterogenous
communities. The focus of this work is on transactions among community mem-
bers, where each member interacts with different partners as time passes by. Ap-
plications of this setting abound, including credit relations –where borrowers can
borrow from different sources–, and durable goods transactions –where producers
sell to different consumers.
Though the impossibility of establishing long term personal relationships is
inherent to the economic setting under consideration (which makes the folk the-
orem, as established by Fudenberg and Maskin (1986), unapplicable), this does
not undermine the feasibility of attaining Pareto efficient outcomes. Indeed, when
the matched players play a prisoners’ dilemma, a consequence of pioneer works
by Milgrom et al. (1990), Kandori (1992), and Okuno-Fujiwara and Postlewaite
(1995) is that cooperation is enforceable if there is an institution that can credible
convey play histories (so that community members can recognize and punish a
defector). It has been argued that the role of institutions such as credit bureaus,
online feedback systems, clubs and business associations is precisely to provide
such information. So far, this literature has either ignored the presence of hetero-
geneity in large populations, or been silent on the consequences of heterogeneity
in cooperation and welfare.
Understanding the impact of heterogeneity on the cooperation degree among
community members is important for several reasons. First, it would be surprising
were people’s cooperation attitudes similar. From a mathematical viewpoint, the
presence of some degree of heterogeneity is generic once we consider a sufficiently
rich model of a large community. Less formally, while the forms of heterogeneity
we look at are unobservable, the fact that we live in communities exhibiting
observable heterogeneity (race, traditions, income, religion) suggests that those
heterogeneities may have an impact on members’ cooperation tendencies.
Second, the existence of heterogeneity in cooperation (or honest behavior)
tendencies is suggested by the fact that a common practice among employers, in-
surance companies and landlords is to look at the financial history of prospective
partners (employees, insureds and tenants) as reported by credit-reporting agen-
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cies.1 Following Kandori (1992) or Okuno-Fujiwara and Postlewaite (1995), one
could argue that those employers, insurance companies, and landlords are will-
ing to punish prospective partners that cheated some financial market member
because if they don’t they get punished in the future. But employers and land-
lords are financial market outsiders and so they cannot receive any punishment if
they contract a defector. The actual reason by which employers and landlords are
willing to spend resources to obtain the financial situation of prospective partners
may have much more to do with some idiosyncratic characteristic of defectors
than with some implicit self-enforcement force.2
Finally, laboratory experiments with the prisoners’ dilemma find substantial
heterogeneity of behavior; see Andreoni and Miller (1993). Greif (1993) provides
a case study showing how cooperation arises among some but not all community
members. Casual observation shows a variety of ways in which people interact
in social settings. For example, some people consistently breach their financial
obligations and eventually get expelled from the financial system; some others
adhere to their obligations and stay long in the system. If there were no intrinsic
asymmetry among these agents, then we would need to understand the origin of
that behavioral asymmetry. Even though it is not hard to build a repeated game
model having several asymmetric equilibria, we would then need to find out a
more ultimate cause for the heterogeneous play of agents.
Once we acknowledge the existence of heterogeneity in large communities,
several questions naturally arise. What are the effects of heterogeneity in cooper-
ation and welfare? What conditions make heterogeneity more attractive from a
social perspective? What mechanisms may overcome the adverse selection prob-
lem posed by the unobservability of agents’ innate cooperation tendencies? Can
the community delegate that screening problem to private intermediaries?
The present paper offers a theoretical study aimed at answering these and other
related questions. We posit a self-governance model of a community consisting
of a continuum of infinitely lived agents. At each period, each agent is randomly
matched to some other community member to play a prisoners’ dilemma. From
1This happens in developed as well as developing countries. Consult Hunt (2002) for details
about the credit reporting system in the US.
2See Subsection 3.5.2 for a more detailed discussion.
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a modeling viewpoint, the main innovation of this paper comes from considering
agents that enjoy cooperation in different degrees. This cooperation level is called
the agent’s type and belongs to a compact set of types. Once the match is realized,
a player does not know anything about who he is playing with, nor will he be able
to recognize his current opponent later on. All what is known to the matched
agents (and is common knowledge) is a pair of marks a-la-Kandori. The mark
of each player at each round can be either G (standing for good past behavior)
or B (standing for bad bad past behavior), and evolves according to the player’s
play. The evolution of a player’s mark creates a link between current and future
behavior that may make cooperation enforceable at least for some matches.
Our game model possesses a variety of untractable strategies consistent with
sequential equilibrium restrictions. It is therefore necessary to add some more
structure to equilibrium play. We first restrict equilibria to be stationary. Cru-
cially, we additionally consider informationally robust equilibria, namely, equilib-
ria that remain so when some additional signal on a player’s type is available.
We finally impose monotonicity of cooperation, a condition implying that if some
agent has a good G mark (henceforth called a cooperative agent), then so does
any agent with a higher innate tendency towards cooperation. These restrictions
allow us to fully characterize any equilibrium exhibiting some cooperation by the
equilibrium lowest cooperative type.
Our first result fully characterizes the equilibrium set. In particular, it shows
that any equilibrium is the fixed point of a nondecreasing function. Roughly
speaking, this function maps the expected number of cooperative players to the
number of players that are willing to cooperate given the expected cooperative
players. It is monotone because of the following network externality mechanism:
The larger the set of agents expected to cooperate, the more the matches in which
a player encounters a cooperative player, so the higher the continuation value of
a cooperative player, and the larger the set of players indeed willing to cooperate.
We then employ standard lattice theory techniques to derive some comparative
statics results. It is shown that the Pareto optimal equilibrium can be character-
ized as the smallest fixed point of a nondecreasing map. Additionally, it is proven
that an increase in the discount factor leads to an increase in cooperation. It is
also shown that given any equilibrium, an increase in the fraction of types greater
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than or equal to the lowest cooperative type leads to an increase in cooperation;
so that, in particular, a first order stochastic increase in the distribution of types
results in an expansion in cooperation. Less obviously, it is shown that a second
order stochastic increase of the distribution of types has ambiguous effects on
total cooperation and welfare. So, more heterogenous societies may sustain more
cooperation and deliver higher welfare to their members.
The analysis so far assumes that at the beginning of the game marks are
assigned as if a central authority could perfectly monitor players’ types. Of course,
that needs not be the case for players may not be willing to reveal their types. It
is shown that a simple way to solve this adverse selection problem is by selling the
good marksG at the beginning of the game and then let equilibrium play transpire.
Indeed, by setting the right price a social planner can implement the Pareto
optimal equilibrium. The mechanism is simple enough as to be implemented in
practice and is robust to the existence of a market for names, as studied by Tadelis
(2002).
We then explore private intermediation, where the assignment of marks is
carried out by profit-motivated monopolist. We fully characterize the monopoly
solution, and show that when the defection payoff is sufficiently high, the mo-
nopolist will find optimal to implement the Pareto optimal equilibrium. So, in
some circumstances, the community can delegate the intermediation problem to
a profit maximizing monopolist.
We offer two main applications of our results. First, while several empiri-
cal works study the link between cooperation (or trust), output, and population
heterogeneity, virtually no economic theory has been developed to address this
question.3 Our theoretical results represent an advance in this respect by deriv-
ing structural relations linking trust and total output and by showing what forms
of heterogeneity enhance trust and cooperation.
Second, our dynamic adverse selection-moral hazard model delivers insights on
the impact of information disclosure in credit markets. Indeed, it is shown that
the access of outsiders to credit histories unambiguously improves efficiency in
financial relations. This is so whenever the outsider finds strictly optimal to hire
3As Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) point out: “The theory of what determines trust is sketchy
at best.”
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types with a sufficiently high tendency towards cooperation so that defectors suffer
not only punishment in their credit operations but also exclusion in secondary
markets. In other words, information disclosure may be seen as a substitute to
the infliction of punishment after defection studied by Milgrom et al. (1990), and
Dixit (2003a).
Related Literature. Several authors have studied cooperation in large
communities. In settings where players may play against varying opponents, Mil-
grom et al. (1990), Okuno-Fujiwara and Postlewaite (1995), and Kandori (1992)
show that, by introducing an institution that can credible convey information
on past play, cooperation can be sustained even if there are substantial informa-
tional asymmetries between opponents. A similar study of information intermedi-
aries is presented by Dixit (2003a). The present work builds on the institutional
insights offered by these authors, but studies the consequences of considering
payoff-asymmetric agents. In this respect, this work offers a generalization to this
literature.
When no institution as the one described above is available, cooperation may
still be an equilibrium outcome. Indeed, Kandori (1992) and Ellison (1994) show
that cooperation may be enforced by means of contagious defection pushed by a
single defection. It does not seem clear how the contagious equilibrium analysis
may overcome the difficulties posed by agents’ heterogeneity.4 Moreover, as dis-
cussed by Dixit (2003b), the existence of some degree of official law is necessary
to sustain cooperation when the community is sufficiently large.
A repeated game model with (almost) random matching and no information
flow is posited by Ghosh and Ray (1996). These authors consider an heterogenous
population where the type of a player cannot be identified in advance and, after
any match, players can opt to continue the relation. When both agents in the
match cooperate, they reveal themselves as cooperative and there are mutual
gains at keeping the relation on. While the institutional setting Ghosh and Ray
(1996) model is different from mine, their work seems to be the first one giving
an explicit role to heterogeneity in models of large community enforcement where
agents are randomly matched.5
4In that setting, after being cheated, an agent cannot distinguish a truly defector from a
cooperative agent that defects.
5Repeated games models considering heterogeneous agents typically restrict attention to two
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More recently, Mobius and Szeidl (2006) and Haag and Lagunoff (2006) have
studied models of self-governance in heterogenous communities and derived rela-
tions linking heterogeneity to some measure of aggregate cooperation and trust.
From a modeling perspective, the present work follows more closely the repeated
game theories of randomly matched partners. At a substantial level, their com-
parative statics results –discussed in the main text– contrast with mine sharply.
Greif (1993) studies an economic institution which enabled the Maghribis –
a group of Jewish 11th-century traders– to overcome the agency problems here
presented. Greif (1993) notes that the Maghribis did not hold agency relations
with Jewish Italian merchants even though, absent transaction costs, these were
perceived as beneficial.6 The theory here advanced explains this as a “statistical
discrimination” phenomenon whose origin is efficiency considerations.7
The Rest of the Paper. Section 2 introduces the model and the equilibrium
concept. Section 3 contains the main results of the paper. The equilibrium set
is fully characterized and conditions are provided for the non-emptiness of the
equilibrium set. Some comparative statics results are shown. It is shown that
the adverse selection problem can be solved by a social planner who sells the
marks G at the right price. Section 4 offers some additional related results. The
consequences of more general forms of heterogeneity are studied, and equilibrium
outcomes excluded from the main analysis are shown. We additional study model’s
stability by introducing some degree of contractual incompleteness, and show that
in this situation defection fines that clean up financial histories may be Pareto
improving. Section 5 presents some concluding remarks.
type models. For example, Kreps et al. (1982), Ghosh and Ray (1996), and Dixit (2003a)
consider models where some agents are behavioral (in the sense that they always cooperate
or defect) and others are homogenously opportunistically motivated. My model encompasses
general forms of agents’ heterogeneity, including finite and continuous type set.
6Relatedly, Fearon and Laitin (1996) have documented the prevalence of cooperation among
groups exhibiting observable heterogeneity in the absence of law. Post-soviet republics and
post-independence Africa constitute their chief examples.
7Greif (1993) casts doubts on the importance of payoff heterogeneity at explaining some of
these phenomena. He argues that the divergence may be explained by studying each group’s
cultural beliefs and their effect on equilibrium selection.
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2 The Model
2.1 Games and Assignments
There is a continuum of players alive at each period t ≥ 1. Denote the set of
players by I. At each round t, a matching function Mt(·) is randomly selected so
that player i ∈ I interacts with player Mt(i) at round t.8
Each player is characterized by a parameter θ ∈ R which is its private infor-
mation. From others’ perspective, the parameter θ of each player is distributed
according to F , a probability distribution with support Θ contained in R+. At
each t, the matched players play a two-person stage game Γ(θi, θj), where θi and θi
are the types of the two matched players i and j. We assume that the stage game
is a prisoners’ dilemma, where each player may either cooperate (C) or defect (D),
and where the payoff from cooperation depends on each player’s type. The per
period payoff matrix is shown in the figure below.
C D
C θi θj −l g
D g −l 0 0
Assume that l ≥ 0 and, to make the game a prisoners’ dilemma, assume that
for all θ ∈ Θ, g > θ ≥ 0. Denote the action set A = {C,D} and let π(ai, aj, θi) be
the period payoff function of a type θi player when it plays ai and its rival plays
aj.
Denote ati the action chosen by player i at round t. Then, given a realization







where δ ∈]0, 1[ is the community discount factor.
When two players are matched to play the stage game, they cannot distinguish
who they are playing with, nor are they going to be able to identify their current
8A matching function M must satisfy M(M(i)) = i 6= M(i).
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opponent later on. All what the matched players know about each other is a mark
which follows a Markov process. The set of marks is {G,B}, where G stands for
“good”, and B stands for “bad”. There exists a function η : {G,B}×{G,B}×A→
{G,B} such that when a player has a mark mi, faces an opponent with mark mj,
and plays ai, his next period mark is given by η(mi,mj, ai). Additionally, before
the first period of play, players are assigned a mark according to a function ψ(θ).
We call the pair (ψ, η) a status assignment. All aspects of the game but the
idiosyncratic type of each player are common knowledge.
I assume that η satisfies the following restrictions:
η(B, ·, ·) = B and
(
η(G,G, a) = G iff a = C
)
.
The idea behind the first restriction is that punishments are severe in that a mark
B is perfectly persistent. The second restriction motivates the G-marked players
to cooperate when facing another G-marked player. Many of the results here
presented remain valid when alternative restrictions are imposed.
If a type θ player has a mark mit and its rival’s mark is m
Mt(i)
t , then its period t





9 Strategies are restricted to be symmetric




Mt(i), θ) satisfying sequential rationality and generating consistent beliefs
may lead to a convoluted dynamics that makes the model untractable. This is
the reason we impose additional restrictions on equilibrium play.
2.2 Equilibrium Definition
The tuple (ψ, η, a) is stationary if at ≡ at′ for all t, t′, and, on the play-path,
the mark of each player does not change. By this last sentence we mean that if
ψ(θ) = G (resp. ψ(θ) = B) then as the game goes on, the mark of player θ is
G (resp. B) as long as the evolution of marks is according to η and all players
conform to the strategy a. From here on we simply write a(mi,mj, θ) to denote
the stationary period strategy of players.
We say that the strategy is informationally robust if, on the play path, a(mi,mj, θ)
9Standard dynamic programming arguments show that given that rivals follow this kind of
strategy, there is always a best response of this type.
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does not depend on θ. In particular, by observing the marks of each of the matched
players it is possible to know what the players will choose. The idea behind this
restriction is the following. When matched to other player, a player may know
not only the marks given by the status assignment but also some additional in-
formation about its partner (e.g., race, clothe brand, educational level, religion).
That additional information may be correlated to the idiosyncratic parameter θ
of its rival. By imposing robustness we are ruling out the cases in which that
additional information is valuable. The presence of some external signals about
the partners may provide information about the partners’ types but not about
how play will unfold.10
Beliefs are history-independent. That is, at each period of play players beliefs
about the population distribution of marks is
P[a player randomly picked has type θ ∈ O and mark G] = P[θ ∈ O, η(θ) = G],
whereO ⊆ Θ. On-the-equilibrium path this is a consequence of Bayes rule and the
stationarity assumption. Off-the-equilibrium path this is justified for, as the game
goes on, each player will see at most a finite number of deviations (interpreted as
trembles). A finite number of deviations can never modify the distribution in a
continuum.
Stationarity, robustness, and sequential rationality still do not restrict equilib-
rium outcomes enough. To restrict the structure of the problem a little further,
consider the set of G marked players
P = {θ ∈ Θ | η(θ) = G}
These players are called cooperative. The evolution of noncooperative players
mark does not depend on actions. So, noncooperative players never cooperate. If
a cooperative-cooperative match ended up in defection, then there would be no
difference between cooperative and noncooperative players.11 To avoid trivialities,
a match of cooperative players is restricted to end up in cooperation. The following
lemma shows that a cooperative agent, when faced to a noncooperative agent, will
never cooperate.
10In the Appendix it is shown that informational robustness is intimately linked to stationary.
11In this case, cooperative players are not willing to cooperate when faced to a noncooperative
player for its continuation reward from doing so is negative.
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Lemma 1 Consider a stationary robust tuple (ψ, η, a) such that a is sequentially
rational. Then, for no type and at no history, the outcome of a match is (C,D).
If (C,D) were the outcome of a cooperative-noncooperative match, then the
value of being noncooperative would be strictly positive. This in turn makes
cooperative players willing to defect when faced to a noncooperative partner. A
consequence of this result is that we may restrict our attention to assignments η
such that η(G,B, a) = C if and only if a = D.
The following monotonicity restriction is finally imposed: If θ ≥ θ′ and θ′ ∈ P ,
then θ ∈ P . That is, if some type is cooperative then so is any type with a higher
tendency towards cooperation. The idea behind this restriction is that if we can
enforce cooperation of type θ, then enforcing cooperation of type θ′ ≥ θ is not
only feasible but Pareto dominates the situation in which θ′ is noncooperative.
So, there is no reason to exclude θ′ from P .
An immediate corollary of the restriction above is that P must be an interval,
which is additionally restricted to be closed12 (eventually empty). An equilibrium
with a nonempty set of cooperative players is therefore characterized by a type
θe ∈ Θ such that
η(θ) =
G if θ ≥ θe,B if not.
We define the set
Equil =
{
θe ∈ Θ | θe characterizes stationary, informationally robust, monotone,
and sequentially rational strategies with P 6= ∅
}
.
Note that the configuration in which η(θ) = B for all θ ∈ Θ and no player ever
cooperates is an equilibrium which however is not in the set Equil. The focus
of this paper is on equilibria exhibiting some degree of cooperation. From here
on, by equilibrium we mean the cutoff parameter that characterizes a stationary,
robust, monotone, and sequentially rational strategy exhibiting some cooperation.
In the Appendix, we analyze a model where neither stationarity nor informa-
tional robustness are imposed. It is shown that the long run evolution in that
12This restriction is a normalization which will prove useful.
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more general model looks exactly as a stationary and informationally robust equi-
librium.
2.3 Observations
Several remarks are in order. In the model, the community problem is twofold. On
the one hand, there is a moral hazard problem in that actions cannot be enforced
externally. The second problem, which at this moment is absent, is an adverse
selection problem. So far we have assumed that by means of some mechanism it
is possible to monitor the type θ of each player and assign the marks according
to η(θ) at the outset of play. Of course, when asked its type, a player would
pretend to have a high type. In the next section, we will investigate in detail a
price mechanism through which the adverse selection problem can be solved.
The analysis assumes the presence of some degree of institutional development.
Though actions cannot be enforced, there must be an outsider able to observe,
keep record of, and credible convey transpired societal play. Our preferred way
to solve the adverse selection problem consists of allowing transactions between
game agent (buyers) and an outsider (seller). Later on, we will analyze a profit-
maximizing monopoly that can play the seller role. The model therefore seems
suited to a somehow structured community.
A crucial consequence of the robustness assumption is that any equilibrium
remains so when all histories become public. In this case, there is no need for
the marks.13 Different applications of the model will restrict the publicity of
information in different ways. I have preferred to work in a setting with partially
public histories (where the mark is the only proxy for histories) to expand and
highlight the informational richness of the analysis.
At a more technical level, there are well known measurability problems when
13This result contrasts with the models of cooperation with asymmetrically informed agents
living during a finite number of periods. In those models, the crux to keep cooperation is the
ignorance of one agent about the motives of the other to cooperate.This is the case in the finitely
repeated prisoners’ dilemma studied by Kreps et al. (1982). In that model, cooperation can
be enforced for a finite number of period as long as the rationality of one of the parts is not
common knowledge.
13
working with random matching models. While the law of large numbers had been
extensively employed in random matching economic models, these difficulties had
been overcome only recently. See Duffie and Sun (2006).
3 Analysis
3.1 Characterization and Existence
Consider any θe ∈ Equil. Then, for all θ ≥ θe, η(θ) = G and player θ is willing
to cooperate when so does his rival. The total expected continuation payoff of





where F (x−) = limy↗x F (y) is the probability of encountering a type greater than
or equal to x. Since type θ is cooperative, it must be the case that
θ + δv(θ, θe) ≥ g. (3.1)
The left hand side in this equation is the payoff that player θ obtains by cooper-
ating, which is the current payoff θ plus the total discounted payoff when its next
period mark is G. The right hand side in (3.1) is player θ’s payoff when it defects.
In this case, it will get g in the current period plus the payoff when its mark is B
(in which case no match in which the player is involved will be cooperative). In
particular, there exists x ≥ 0 such that
θe + δv(θe, θe) = g + x. (3.2)
Define
T x(θe) = min{θ ∈ Θ | θ + δv(θ, θe) ≥ g + x}
Since Θ is compact and θe satisfies equation (3.2), T x(θe) is well defined and
T x(θe) = θe.
Inspired by the above analysis, we define the closed set14







≥ g + x},
14To see that the set is closed, note that (1− F (x−)) is upper semi-continuous in x ∈ R.
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with θ̄ = max{θ ∈ Θ} and x ∈ [0, x̄], where x̄ = θ̄
1−δ − g is assumed positive.
Define the map T x : Θ 7→ Θ by
T x(θe) =
min{θ ∈ Θ | θ + δv(θ, θe) ≥ g + x} if θe ≤ θ̄x,θ̄ if not,
where θ̄x = max{θ ∈ Θx}. Note that Θx = Θ ∩ [0, θ̄x] and θ̄x is non increasing.
Importantly, given T x|Θx , T x defined on Θ is its smallest nondecreasing extension.
T x(θe) is the smaller type willing to cooperate even if the gain from deviating
were g + x provided all types greater than or equal to θe are being cooperative.
The parameter x represents the degree at which the incentive constraint of the
lowest type is satisfied.
The following lemma will prove useful.
Lemma 2 Suppose that x̄ ≥ 0. For all x ∈ [0, x̄], Θx is nonempty and T x : Θ →
Θ is a well defined nondecreasing function.
Intuitively, the monotonicity property stated in the lemma holds because when
more agents are expected to cooperate (lower θe), an agent will be more willing
to be cooperative for it will be matched more frequently to cooperative agents,
which in turn increases the number of agents that indeed want to cooperate (lower
T x(θe)). This complementarity property (leading to the monotonicity of T x) will
be useful when deriving some comparative statics results.
The logic behind this property is in line with Coleman’s insight on the impor-
tance of network closure. In the present model, and consistent with Coleman’s
view, a dense social network –understood as a high fraction of individuals expected
to belong to the set of cooperative players– makes cooperation more attractive. In
contrast to Chwe (2000), where efficient outcomes are attained in dense networks
by creating common knowledge, in this model mutually beneficial cooperation is
enhanced through collective punishment. See Sobel (2002) for discussion.
For each x ∈ [0, x̄], consider the set of fixed points
Bx = {θe ∈ Θ | T x(θe) = θe}.
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This set is trivially nonempty as a consequence of Tarski fixed point theorem.
Moreover, if Θx 6= Θ, θ̄ = T x(θ̄).
The following theorem is the main result of this subsection. It characterizes






















| θ ∈ Θ} (3.3)
The following condition is necessary and sufficient for the existence of a coopera-
tive equilibrium:
ḡ(δ) ≥ g.
Under this condition, x̄ ≥ 0
The first part of the theorem characterizes the equilibrium set as the union of
all fixed points of the nondecreasing map T x that additionally belong to the set
Θx. This restriction will in general be binding for Θx should not be expected to
coincide with Θ. It is additionally shown that the equilibrium set will be equal
to a set of types satisfying a simple inequality. Both characterizations will be
employed in the paper.
The condition for existence –which is assumed in the sequel to avoid trivialities–
resembles the standard existence inequality in personal enforcement repeated
games with homogenous agents. In that case, considering θ̄ as the only type,





which is precisely the condition given in the theorem for the homogenous popu-
lation case.
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In the Appendix, we study in more detail the equilibrium set. It is shown that
Equil is closed, generically continuous, and may or may not be convex. While at
the moment we can dispense with those results, the reader may want to go over
that analysis before proceeding.
Example 4 Suppose that F is a uniform distribution on the interval [0, 1] , δ = .9
and g = 2 so that an equilibrium exists and can be characterized by employing























and for x > 7
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Figure 1 illustrates the fixed point characterization.
3.2 Pareto Optimality and Comparative Statics
3.2.1 Results
Let θe and θ̂e belong to Equil and suppose that θe < θ̂e. Then θe Pareto-
dominates θ̂e. To see why, note that types θ ≥ θ̂e cooperates in more encounters
under θe than under θ̂e. Types θe ≤ θ < θ̂e never cooperate under θ̂e but cooperate
in some matches under θe. Types θ < θe never cooperate under either equilibrium.
It therefore seems natural to define
θc(F, δ) = arg min{θe | θe ∈ Equil(F, δ)}, (3.4)
where we highlight the equilibrium outcomes dependance on the fundamentals
F and δ (when clear from context, we omit the dependance). The equilibrium
θc = θc(F, δ) is the Pareto optimal equilibrium for the game defined by F, δ.
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Figure 1: The blue line plots T 0, the green line plots T 1/2, and the red line plots
T 2. As already shown, for x > 7
9
, T x has only a trivial fixed point θ̄ = 1 which
does not belong to Θx.
The following result provides a simple condition under which equilibrium set
comparisons can be made.15
Proposition 5 Let θe be a fixed point of the map T x(· | F, δ), where x ∈ [0, x̄]
and where we explicit the dependance of the map T x (defined on subsection 3.1)
on F and δ. Consider an alternative model characterized by a discount factor δ′




(θe | G, δ′) ≤ θe, (3.5)
then, there exists a fixed point θ̂e of T x
′
(· | G, δ′) such that θ̂e ≤ θe. Moreover, the
last inequality can be taken strict if so is the inequality in (3.5).
While this result can be seen as a corollary to Theorem 6 in Milgrom and
Roberts (1990), here we provide a simple and illustrative proof. Consider the
15Echeñique and Sabarwal (2003) presents results guaranteeing that any old equilibrium is
larger than every new equilibrium. While imposing more stringent assumptions, those results
can be applied in our setting too.
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restriction of T x(· | G, δ′) to A = {θ ∈ Θ | θ ≤ θe}. Since T x′(· | G, δ′) is
nondecreasing and by virtue of (3.5), T x
′
(A | G, δ′) ⊆ A. Tarski fixed point
theorem implies the existence of a fixed point θ̂e of T x
′
(· | G, δ′) in A. This
completes the argument.16
The following two corollaries are immediate consequences to the proposition
above.
Corollary 6
θc = min{θ ∈ Θ | T 0(θ) = θ}
Corollary 7 Let θc(F, δ) be the solution of (3.4) and suppose that
T 0(θc(F, δ) | G, δ′) ≤ θc(F, δ).
Then
θc(G, δ′) ≤ θc(F, δ)
If the first inequality is strict, then so is the second one.
The interest of the first corollary is in computing the Pareto optimal equilib-
rium. It proves that we only need to search for the Pareto optimal equilibrium
among the set of fixed point of the map T 0, and there is no need to check whether
that fixed point belongs to Θ0. The result suggests a simple way to compute θc:
Set x0 = θ and xn = T
0(xn−1). It follows that for all n, xn ∈ Θ0 and xn ↗ θc.17
The second corollary permits to do some comparative statics for the Pareto
optimal equilibrium. Of course, these results will be useful only when there are
circumstances under which the Pareto optimal equilibrium is a good prediction of
equilibrium play. This will be discussed in the next subsection.
Before proceeding, we provide some conditions to verify more easily our work-
ing assumptions.
16The same argument shows that when the inequality in (3.5) is reversed, it is possible to
ensure the existence of θ̂e = T x
′
(θ̂e | G, δ′) > θe. This result is not so interesting in our
framework for whenever Θx 6= Θ, θ̄ = T x(θ̄).
17The algorithm will converge even if there is no equilibrium, provided x̄ ≥ 0.
19
Proposition 8 Let θ ∈ Θ. Suppose that F and G have the same support. Then
any of the followings is sufficient for T x(θ | G, δ′) ≤ T x(θ | F, δ):
(i) δ′ ≥ δ, and G  F in the first order stochastic dominance order;
(ii) δ′ ≥ δ, and (1− F (θ−)) ≤ (1−G(θ−)).
Finally, the following result summarizes this subsection main findings.
Theorem 9 Suppose that F and G have the same support Θ and δ, δ′ ∈]0, 1[.
(a) θc(F, δ) ≥ θc(G, δ′), provided either of the followings holds:
(i) δ′ ≥ δ, and G  F in the first order stochastic dominance order;
(ii) δ′ ≥ δ, and (1− F (θc(F, δ)−)) ≤ (1−G(θc(F, δ)−)).
(b) θc(F, δ) ≤ θc(G, δ′), provided the following holds:
(iii) δ ≥ δ′, and (1− F (θ−)) ≥ (1−G(θ−)) for all θ ≤ θc(F, δ).
The consequences of condition (i) in part (a) are to be expected. If agents
discount less the future or obtain more utility from cooperation, then it is possible
to support more cooperation. Less obvious is the condition stated in (ii). It says
that if the fraction of agents having type grater than or equal to θc(F, δ) increases,
then the new Pareto optimal equilibrium exhibits at least as much cooperation as
the original one. Part (b) states a partial converse to part (a) (ii). As a result, as
will be illustrated soon, a second order stochastic increase of the distribution of
types may have an ambiguous impact on cooperation.
Theorem 9 provides cooperative statics results for the set P . Yet, it says
nothing about whether the proportion of cooperative players increases or decreases
when the distributions are modified. The following corollary provides such results.
Corollary 10 Suppose that F and G have the same support Θ and δ, δ′ ∈]0, 1[.
(a) Under either (i) or (ii) above, the proportion of cooperative players is bigger









(b) Under (iii) above, the proportion of cooperative players is bigger under F









The following example illustrates some of our comparative statics results.
Example 11 (Heterogeneity: Second order stochastic dominance) Consider
a four type model Θ = {θ1, θ2, θ3, θ4} where all types are equally likely: F (θi) =
i/4. The discount factor is δ = 0.9 and g = 1. The model is constructed so that
the only equilibrium is θc = θ4. Note that the necessary and sufficient conditions















































Define α = 1
6
so that θ2 = αθ4 + (1− α)θ1. For β > 0, consider the following
mean preserving spread of F :
P




+ β(1− α) if i = 1,
1
4
− β if i = 2,
1
4
if i = 3,
1
4
+ βα if i = 4,
where β < 1/4.18
18 We can interpret probability P β as follows. Draw θ according to F . If θ = θ2, set θ̃ = θ2
with probability (1− 4β), θ̃ = θ1 with probability 4β(1− α), and θ̃ = θ4 with probability 4βα.
If θ 6= θ2, then set θ̃ = θ. Pβ is the distribution of θ̃.
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. Moreover, it is relatively simple to see that this
is the Pareto optimal equilibrium. This proves that a second order stochastic
decrease may lead to an increase in cooperation and total welfare. From here on,
set β̄ = 1
99
.
Now, define γ = 1
3
so that θ3 = γθ4 + (1 − γ)θ1. Consider a mean preserving





+ β̄(1− α) + λ(1− γ) if i = 1,
1
4
− β̄ if i = 2,
1
4
− λ if i = 3,
1
4
+ β̄α+ λγ if i = 4,
where λ < 1
4
. Now, I argue that we can pick λ < 1
4
so that the only equilibrium
under the distribution P λ is θ4. It is sufficient to impose the conditions.
1− F λ(θ3−) =
1
2
+ β̄α− λ(1− γ) < 1
2
.




. This proves that a second order stochastic
decrease may lead to a decrease in cooperation.
In this example, a second order stochastic decrease in the distribution of types
(which holds by setting β̄ = 1
99
) implies that more agents have types above the
cooperation threshold θ4 and so, the new equilibrium exhibits more cooperation
(Theorem 9 (ii)). Once the distribution F β̄ is fixed by setting β̄ = 1
99
, a new
second order stochastic decrease was implemented. This new distribution puts
more weight on the set {θ1, θ2} so that those types as well as type θ3 players
become less willing to cooperate. As a consequence (Theorem 9 (iii)), the new
equilibrium exhibits less cooperation.
This analysis contrasts with that by Haag and Lagunoff (2006). These authors
posit a dynamic game model where a set of agents play repeatedly a stage game
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against the same opponents so that long term cooperation is sustained through
personal enforcement. Haag and Lagunoff (2006) show that a second order in-
crease in the distribution of types unambiguously leads to an increase in average
cooperation (a definition which is not related to welfare in that model). The
difference arises in the varying opponent aspect of my model. In this model, an
increase in the fraction of cooperative players may push some formerly noncoop-
erative players to cooperate for the value of cooperation increases. This increase
in the fraction of cooperative players is consistent with a second order stochas-
tic decrease in the distribution of types. In the Haag-Lagunoff model, players
play against the same opponent always which makes the above discussed effect
absent.19
In the next example, we draw a more detailed parallel between my result
and Haag and Lagunoff (2006)’s. This example also exhibits the no-monotonicity
property of our previous example.
Example 12 Consider first an homogenous model, where the only type in pop-
ulation is θ = θf . The necessary and sufficient condition for cooperation is
θf ≥ g(1− δ).
We can also consider the following personal enforcement model. There are two
agents, who play a prisoners’ dilemma repeatedly. So the only difference between
the personal enforcement model and the main model discussed in the text is that
in the former each of the two agents interact with the same partner. In the
personal enforcement model, if types are homogenous θ = θf , cooperation takes
place if and only if
θ ≥ g(1− δ).
Therefore, the random matching model and a continuum of personal enforcement
models are undistinguishable from a behavioral perspective. This is so because
given homogeneity, in each round a player in the random matching model is facing
19Mobius and Szeidl (2006) propose a social network model, where aggregate trust (under-
standing trust as the amount of money that one agent can lend from another) is decreasing in
heterogeneity. In their model, this is so for a reason somehow resembling the mechanism in Haag
and Lagunoff (2006)’s model: Trust is governed by the weakest link among paths connecting
pairs of agents.
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an opponent which is identical in all respects to the ones previously faced and all
relevant information is public. From here on, we set θf = g(1− δ).
Now, add heterogeneity to the models. To do that, consider two types θ =
θf − α and θ̄ = θf + α, where α ∈]0, θf ]. In the personal enforcement model,
suppose that each of the two players has a different type. For all α > 0, no
cooperation can take place. Indeed, the lower type player will never find optimal
to cooperate for θ = θf − α < g(1− δ), and as a consequence, the hight type will
never cooperate.
In the random matching model, suppose that half of the population is of type
θf −α and the other half is of type θf +α. We may think of α as parameterizing
the distribution of types, so that an increase in α is equivalent to a second order
stochastic decrease in the distribution of types. In the random matching model,
low type players will never cooperate. The high type players may or may not
cooperate depending on α. To see that, note that a high type player will cooperate










This condition holds whenever
α ≥ δ(1− δ)
2− δ
g.
Since θf > δ(1−δ)
2−δ g, this condition can be met.
A more general personal enforcement model is studied by Haag and Lagunoff
(2006). Two are the main differences between the personal enforcement model
here studied and the one studied by them. First, Haag and Lagunoff (2006) allow
players to play and monitor mixed strategies. So, in principle, the low type players
could cooperate with some positive probability. Second, in the work by Haag and
Lagunoff (2006), there is heterogeneity in players discount factors but not in the
gains from cooperation. Neither of these differences seems relevant to either their
results or our purposes.
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3.3 Adverse Selection and Social Planner Pricing
So far our analysis has been not fully comprehensive in that we have not described
the way in which players will be sorted out by the function ψ at the onset of the
game. We may be interested, for example, in implementing the Pareto optimal
equilibrium θc. One imaginable mechanism is to ask the players about their types.
A player gets a mark G if and only if it claims to have a type θ ≥ θc. Of course,
under this arrangement players have an incentive to misreport and claim to have
a high type. It seems therefore important to look at mechanisms that may solve
this problem in a simple way.
We propose a simple mechanism where, at the beginning of the game, marks
G are sold at a price p ∈ R (to be defined). That is, instead of assigning marks
according to ψ, a seller offers an unlimited amount of marks G at a price p. Those
agents who do not buy a mark G get a mark B. Once the marks are assigned, each
agent’s mark evolves according to the assignment η previously described. We can
interpret the price p as a club membership fee. (We go over this interpretation in
more detail later on.)
Suppose that we can implement the Pareto optimal equilibrium by setting a
price p. Consider the equilibrium cutoff type θc and all types above θc. At the




if it is assigned a G mark, and 0 if its mark is B. So, a type θ ≥ θc will be willing
to buy a mark G if and only if
πc(θc) ≥ p,
Now, a type θ < θc has a slightly different payoff for if it gets a mark G, then






So, for a type θ < θc not to buy a mark G, this quantity has to be less than or
equal to p.
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The following proposition proves that it is possible to set a price so that the
proposed assignment implements the Pareto optimal equilibrium.
Proposition 13 The set of prices over which a seller can implement the optimal
equilibrium is nonempty.
This result provides a simple mechanism through which a social planer may
implement the optimal equilibrium θc. Note that this price mechanism, which can
also be implemented by charging a membership fee each period, is robust to sev-
eral variations. It is robust to a secondary club membership market, where club
members may sell their membership to nonmembers. This secondary membership
market resembles the market for names, as studied by Tadelis (2002). So, the
sorting mechanism is robust to a market for names. Moreover, in the continuous
distribution case, incentives are strict for all but a negligible population fraction.
Indeed, only the cutoff type is indifferent between buying and not buying a mem-
bership. In particular, had we solved its indifference in a different way, it would
not have changed the incentives of the rest of the agents. These are also features
of the price mechanisms discussed below.
The price mechanism here studied may be seen as providing a theory of network
formation. The coalition can be interpreted as a club and the agent in charge of
the club (that is, in charge of selling the memberships and providing the marks
as play histories unfold) may be seen as an information intermediary. The club
membership fee is p and an agent stays in the club so long as he complies with the
club’s norms.20 The “law merchants” in medieval France (Milgrom et al. (1990))
and Sicilian mafia in southern Italy (Dixit (2003a)) may be seen as chief examples
of institutions providing the information intermediation activities here studied.21
As noted by Milgrom et al. (1990) and Dixit (2003a), some information inter-
20 Balmaceda (2006) and Vega-Redondo (2006) study models where both network formation
and self-enforcing cooperation arise endogenously. This subsection can be seen as studying price
mechanisms that affect the network formation.
21More generally, several other organizations may be seen as providing information dissemi-
nation after charging a membership fee. While not their main service, clubs aimed at resolving
the problem of provision of public goods (Buchanan (1965), Ellickson et al. (1999)) do facilitate
the spread of information. In the absence of altruistic motives, charity and rotary clubs may
also be seen as providing such a flow of information.
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mediary institutions also engaged in enforcement activities by directly punishing
defectors. Formally speaking, in our model such punishment implies a decrease in
g which, as a consequence of our previous analysis, leads to a decrease in θc and,
in turn, to an increase in aggregate cooperation. We will show later on in the
paper how the presence of heterogeneity among community members allows the
information intermediary to engage in punishing activities in a much more subtle
and indirect way.
3.4 Monopoly Intermediation
As noted by Dixit (2003a), in the absence of a legal system or a social planner
able to perform the information intermediation activities previously explored, pri-
vate for-profit intermediation may be an equilibrium outcome. In this subsection
I study how a monopolist will price club’s memberships. I will abstract from
extortion and double-crossing practices by simply focusing on the quantity-price
tradeoff faced by a monopolist (who can credible commit to convey play histories)
when setting the membership fee.22
Consider first any equilibrium θe ∈ Equil. The same argument we employed
to ensure the implementability of θc allows us to show that θe can be implemented
by setting a price p ∈ R+. Moreover, the monopoly will optimally set the highest




so that the monopoly extracts all the rent of the cutoff type θe. The monopoly
problem is therefore defined as
max{p(θe)(1− F (θe−)) | θe ∈ Equil},
a problem which has always a solution. In particular, we are restricting the
monopoly to implement outcomes that are consistent with our equilibrium no-
tion. This is somehow similar to the mechanism design literature methodology,
22The for-profit intermediary may extort agents with a clean history by threatening to assert
they cheated in the past) or double-cross some agents (by allowing some players to cheat while
keeping their history clean). Dixit (2003a) shows how these moral hazard problems on the
intermediary side restrict the intermediary problem. Those constraints could be considered in
this model too.
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where the modeler restricts the mechanism designer to implement mechanism
that possess an equilibrium. In our model, the monopolist (mechanism designer)
set prices (mechanisms) such that the game (mechanism) played after the price
(mechanism) is set has an equilibrium.
In a departure from the standard monopoly problem, the tradeoff faced by
our monopolist is not clear-cut. To see that, note that an increase in θe implies a
decrease in total quantity (1−F (θ−)). But this decrease in the total memberships
may not lead to an increase in the price p(θe). Indeed, even when the type of the
marginal type θe increases, its willingness to pay may decrease as a result of the
decrease in the number of cooperative encounters. So, p(θe) may be decreasing in
θe.
To see how the mechanism above may work, suppose that for some x ∈ [0, x̄],
θe and θe′ are two cooperative equilibria such that θe, θe′ ∈ Bx∪Θx. For simplicity,








= g + x.
This equation can be equivalently written as
θ + δp(θ) = g + x.
An increase in θ implies a decrease in p(θ). This means that by rising the marginal
type the monopolist is not only selling less marks but also at a lower price per
unit. The monopolist will therefore prefer min{θe, θe′} over max{θe, θe′}.
The above discussion seems promising in terms of the incentives of the mo-
nopolist to implement the optimal equilibrium θc. It happens, however, that the
ability of the monopolist to pick the slackness of the incentive constraint may
make profitable to implement some other equilibrium.
From here on, assume that F is continuously differentiable with support [a, b],
where 0 ≤ a < b. Denote its derivative by f(θ), and assume that f(θ) > 0 for all
θ ∈ [a, b]. Define the function
Φ(θ) = 2θ − 1− F (θ)
f(θ)
.
The following assumption is key in our analysis.
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Monotonicity: Φ(θ) is increasing on [a, b].
This assumption is less demanding than the monotone likelihood ratio condition
usually employed in mechanism design; see for example Myerson (1981). In this











θ∗ = min{θ ∈ [a, b] | Φ(θ) = 0}.
It is easy to see that g(δ) < ḡ(δ), where ḡ(δ) is defined by Equation (3.3), and
both of these functions are nondecreasing in δ.
Proposition 14 Under Monotonicity, the following assertions hold:
(i) If g ∈ [g(δ), ḡ(δ)], then the monopoly problem has θm = θc as solution.
(ii) If g ∈]b, g(δ)[, then the monopoly problem has solution θm > θc.














The first two statements characterize the monopoly problem solutions. The
logic behind these results is the following. When g is sufficiently big, less players
are willing to cooperate, and therefore the equilibrium set Equil is small. It
is then proven that when Equil is sufficiently small, the whole equilibrium set
belongs to the decreasing portion of the monopolist objective function. So, the
best the monopolist can do is to set θm = θc.
To interpret Equation (3.6), note that ḡ(δ)−b is the Lebesgue measure of those
g for which all the period games are prisoners’ dilemma having an equilibrium
exists. On the other hand ḡ(δ)−max{b, g(δ)} is the Lebesgue measure of the set
29
of g under which the model has an equilibrium and the monopoly problem has
the Pareto optimal equilibrium as its solution. Therefore, viewing g as randomly
draw from a uniform distribution, the quotient in the right hand side of (3.6)
can be interpreted as the probability of getting a model under which the Pareto
optimal problem can be solved by giving to a monopolist the right to sell the
marks, conditional on the model having an equilibrium. The formula gives us the
asymptotic value of this probability, showing in particular that it will be strictly
less than 1.
The monopoly could achieve the same payoff by charging a per period mem-
bership fee. When the monopolist acquires a club with an efficient level of co-
operation, Proposition 14 shows that the monopolist is willing to exclude some
members from the club. Of course, a straightforward way to do it is by rising the
membership fee. However, for the monopolist this may be hard to implement if
club’s members have some influence on the monopolist’s decisions and may not be
willing to accept the exclusion of some members. Indeed, rising the membership
fee and excluding some agents can only harm club’s members. A subtler way to
do it is by misreporting play histories, so that when the membership fee is raised,
no member drops out of the club.23
The following example illustrates the monopoly pricing schemes.
Example 15 Suppose that F (θ) = θ. So the monotonicity assumption is satis-












The threshold ḡ(δ) can be analytically derived. Indeed,
ḡ(θ) =
 14δ(1−δ) if δ ≥ 12 ,1 if δ < 1
2
.
23Some evidence suggests that the fraction of errors in credit histories in the US is substantial
(Hunt (2002)). The mechanism here explored offers an alternative explanation to the conven-
tional views: By misreporting, credit bureaus are shrinking the credit demand but at the same
time this pushes away smaller creditors. After rising the membership fees, no creditor is ex-
pelled. It may be possible that credit bureaus act in behave of large and efficient creditors, and
that misreporting credit histories allow large creditors to exploit a less competitive position.
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There exists a cooperative equilibrium only if δ ≥ 1
2
. The following table shows
the values of g for which there exists a cooperative equilibrium and the monopoly




0.6 0.66 1.04 1
0.75 1 1.33 1
0.8 1.22 1.56 0.60
0.9 2.33 2.77 0.25
0.99 22.33 25.25 0.12
Given that we assume that the prisoners’ dilemma is actually a dilemma for all
matches, we assume that g > 1. The table shows that for all δ ≤ 3/4, provided
an equilibrium exists, the monopoly will always end up picking θc. For δ = 0.9,
the monopoly will pick θc only if g ≥ 2.33, quite a stringent condition given that
for equilibrium existence we require g ≤ 2.77. When g fails to be in the region
[g(δ), ḡ(δ)], the monopoly will unambiguously set θm = 1
3
.
This example suggests that the higher the agents’ patience, the less likely the
monopolist will implement the Pareto optimal equilibrium. Intuitively, this should
be so because the higher the discount factor, the larger the equilibrium set, and
so the more the alternatives the monopolist have to improve upon θc. However, I
have not been able to provide a general statement of this result.
When the monopolist does not implement the Pareto optimal equilibrium,
its monopoly position may be challenged. Depending on the strength of the
competitive forces and the way in which agents coordinate, competition may lead
to implement the Pareto optimal outcome through a single club. We leave for
future research the exploration of these possibilities.
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3.5 Discussion and Applications
3.5.1 Trust, Social Capital, and Community Heterogeneity
Recently, economists have given considerable attention to concepts such as social
capital and trust, and their impact on output and growth. While many conceptual
questions need to be responded –among others, what exactly we mean by social
capital – the analysis here presented contributes to this discussion.
An empirical work by Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) shows that in more racially
and economically heterogenous communities, people are less likely to trust others.
While how people interpret ‘trust’ when asked whether they trust others is an
open question, community agents in our model would interpret it as whether they
are expected to meet someone willing to cooperate during a round encounter. In
this sense, the probability of meeting a cooperative type may be seen as a good
measure of trust in our model.
Our theoretical results identifies the impact of heterogeneity on trust and
cooperation. In particular, it shows that more heterogenous communities need
not exhibit lower levels of trust. This is so because more heterogeneous societies
may have a higher fraction of people with high tendencies towards cooperation,
an aspect that facilitates cooperation.
It seems important to mention that in our model, heterogeneity is non ob-
servable (payoff structure), while in most of empirical studies heterogeneity is
observable (race, income). This is an explanation for why our results might differ
from the empirical results by Alesina and La Ferrara (2002): It is possible that
more racially diverse communities have lesser payoff relevant asymmetries.
Durlauf and Fafchamps (2005) provide an exhaustive survey of the literature on
social capital and economic performance. They show that the relationship between
social capital and aggregate output is by no means empirically established. Simple
OLS regressions fail to capture this relation because social capital is likely an
endogenous variable.24 The present work suggests that a way to settle this issue
24Some attempts to run IV regressions have been made. As discussed by Durlauf and
Fafchamps (2005), the IV variables up to now considered do not seem exogenous.
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is to look at different measures of heterogeneity,25 and exploit the mechanisms
here studied as an answer for why we observe differences in social capital and
output.26
Many economic situation can be thought of as quasi random matching models.
In those models, there are two large populations and, at each round, a population
member is randomly matched to some member in the other population. For ex-
ample, firms (the first group) produce high or low quality goods and consumers
(the second group) demand goods but may renege on payment. As discussed by
Dixit (2003a), in practice cooperation among firms and consumers may be sus-
tained by spreading information about the quality of the goods produced by each
firm (e.g. media and online feedback systems) and by creating networks that al-
low firms to exchange information (e.g. credit bureaus and business associations).
Our methods can be exploited to analyze this class of models too.27
3.5.2 Credit Markets and Credit Bureaus: Information Disclosure
Two somehow disconnected literatures have emerged to model credit bureaus
and their importance on solving the intrinsical information asymmetry in credit
markets. On the one hand, Klein (1992) and Kandori (1992) focus on the moral
hazard aspect involving credit transactions in that borrowers may renege on their
payments. On the other hand, Pagano and Jappelli (1993) stress the importance
of credit bureaus as a means to solve the adverse selection in that each consumer’s
25Of course, what forms of observable heterogeneity are important for our model is an empir-
ical question.
26More specifically, let x be a vector of observed population heterogeneity, and consider the
relations




where θc(xpβ) = min{θ | T 0(θ;xpβ) = θ} and T 0(θ;xpβ) is the map T 0 when the distribution is
F (·;xpβ). In each population p, we may interpret yp as its output and θc as a measure of trust
or social capital. Instrumental variables procedures, taking xp as an exogenous variable, could
be implemented to estimate these relations.
27Suppose that the types distribution in each population is Fp : Θp → [0, 1] for p = 1, 2.
Define the map T x1,x2(θe1, θ
e
2) = (min{θ1 ∈ Θ1 | θ1 is willing to cooperate given θe2},min{θ2 ∈
Θ2 | θ2 is willing to cooperate given θe1}) whenever the feasible sets are nonempty. The rest of
the analysis follows the lines already explored.
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repayment probability is his private information. My view is that both problems
are important to understand the functioning of these relationships.
As already argued in the introduction, the fact that financial market outsiders
are willing to spend resources to obtain the financial market histories of prospec-
tive partners suggests that some form of adverse selection is present. Indeed, if
it were otherwise (or in other words, if there were no payoff relevant difference
between defector and cooperative agents), even if agents were to use different
strategies in the new relation, outsiders (such as landlords and employers) could
renegotiate and prompt financial market defectors to use the strategies followed
by non defectors in the new relation.28 This new contract is optimal for both
the outsider and the defector because the contract would be voluntarily signed by
the outsider and a non defector. Therefore, an outsider wishes to contract both
a defector and a non defector and, as a consequence, is not willing to spend re-
sources to know the financial situation of a prospective partner. This contradicts
the evidence.29
By restricting the model so that some agents repay with some exogenous
probability, it is being assumed that the legal system works so that, at least for
some population members, actions can be enforced ex-post (Pagano and Jappelli
(1993)). In other words, this line of modeling works under the assumption that
there is a working legal system with some capability to enforce contracts. The al-
ternative enforcement mechanism is self-governance and is the focus of this paper.
After all, even in countries with a well functioning legal system, economic agents
need to consider that if they defect, they not only will be legally sanctioned but
also will be credit constrained and eventually expelled from the financial system.
A natural question to ask is whether the disclosure of information is a Pareto
improvement upon a nondisclosure policy. For the question to be under consid-
eration, it is necessary to have outsiders interested in such each agent’s type. We
assume that those outsiders exist and are interested in establishing relationship
28The argument assumes that the cooperative strategies are feasible for a defector. This need
not be so. For example, financial market defectors may be credit constrained and that may
impair them to honor housing market contracts. This example does not seem so relevant for
the labor relation.
29The presence of adverse selection in credit relations has also been suggested by Ausubel
(1999).
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only with agents having a sufficiently high type θ. This is consistent with the
practice among financial market outsiders above discussed. It turns out that dis-
closing information decreases the defection payoff g (pretty much in the same way
as studied by Milgrom et al. (1990), and Dixit (2003a)) because outsiders will
be less willing to establish relationships with B marked agents. In other words,
by disclosing information about play histories, the information intermediary is
punishing defectors de facto.
We assume that Θ = [0, 1] and F has no atom. Suppose that there is a
secondary market (e.g. the labor market), where agents in our model may partic-
ipate.30 In the secondary market, there is a continuum of outsiders (prospective
employers) who, by trading with a type θ agent at a round t, get a payoff V (θ),
where V is nondecreasing. To make the problem interesting, we assume that for
an outsider it is not always optimal to trade so that P[V (θ) < 0] > 0. If an agent
trades, then he gets a payoff W ≥ 0, so for an agent trade is always beneficial. We
assume that, at each t, trade in the secondary market takes place right after the
randomly matched agents play the prisoners’ dilemmas. Two designs are possible:
To disclose agents’ marks or to not disclose those marks.
In the disclosure model where outsiders only trade with G marked agents (a
situation we deem as a good description of reality), an equilibrium in the main
game is a fixed point of the map







≥ g + x},
so defined whenever the feasible set is nonempty. An outsider will indeed be willing
to hire only G marked players if E[V (θ)|θ ≥ θe] ≥ 0 and E[V (θ)|θ ≤ θe] ≤ 0. So,
the Pareto optimal equilibrium in this class is characterized by
θcW = min{θe | θe = T 0,W (θe), E[V (θ)|θ ≥ θe] ≥ 0, E[V (θ)|θ ≤ θe] ≤ 0}.
Now, in the model with no disclosure, the equilibrium is θc = min{θ | θ =
T 0(θ)} and is assumed to be strictly positive. We assume that in the no disclosure
model, secondary market transactions take place, or in other words, E[V (θ)] ≥ 0.
Disclosure will increase cooperation if and only if θcW ≤ θc.
30We stick to the random matching model previously presented. While the moral hazard
problem in credit relations may be better modeled as a one-sided prisoner’s dilemma, the results
we develop can be easily adapted to that setting.
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Proposition 16 (i) If E[V (θ)|θ ≤ θc] ≤ 0, then for all W > 0, θcW < θc.
(ii) If E[V (θ)|θ ≤ θc] > 0, then there exists W̄ > 0 such that for all W ≤ W̄ ,
θcW = θ
c and employers ignore agents’ marks. For W > W̄ , then θcW ≤ θc.
The argument behind this proposition is the following. Suppose that informa-
tion is not being disclosed so that the equilibrium of the model is characterized
by θc. Now, suppose that agents’ marks are disclosed. In (i), outsiders find prof-
itable only to hire agents having a G mark (or a type θ ≥ θc). So, the original
equilibrium is also an equilibrium of the disclosure model and consequently the
disclosure model cannot have a Pareto dominated equilibrium. In (ii), however,
once marks are disclosed, outsiders will still find optimal to hire B marked agents.
When W is small, even if outsiders were not to trade with defectors, that would
only slightly decrease θc so that, by continuity, outsiders must be willing to trade
with everyone. When W small, therefore, it is not possible to improve upon the
no disclosure situation. For W sufficiently large, however, outsiders are indeed
willing to trade only with G marked players and so θcW < θ
c.
The mechanism above somehow resembles the multimarket interaction model
studied by Bernheim and Whinston (1990). The main difference is that in my
model agents punishing defectors in the secondary market may not be part of
the primary game model. Agents in the secondary market punish defectors not
because of some relational force but because defecting is a bad signal on the
defector agents’ intrinsic cooperation tendency.
The result shows that information disclosure cannot decrease cooperation.
However, the result does not say anything about whether efficiency in the sec-
ondary market is improved. By assuming that the outsider’s payoff function takes
the form V (θ) = u(θ)−W , a transaction involving a type θ agent is efficient if and
only if u(θ) ≥ 0. So, if for all θ ∈ [0, 1], u(θ) ≥ 0, then marks disclosure cannot
improve efficiency in the secondary market.31 If, on the other hand, with positive
31Two are the key assumptions that open the possibility for efficiency reduction in the sec-
ondary market. First, we are assuming that E[V (θ)] > 0, so that in the no disclosure case
outsiders are willing to trade with game agents. Second, we are assuming that the price W
is exogenous, and in particular, is not affected by the quality of the expected agent. These
two assumptions are made for tractability and to clarify the role of information disclosure on
cooperation in the main game.
36
probability u(θ) < 0, then information disclosure may improve information in the
secondary market.32
4 Additional Related Results
4.1 More General Heterogeneity
It is possible that agents not only differ in the gains that obtain from coopera-
tion, but, more generally, in their whole payoff profiles. To study this possibility,
suppose that the payoff matrix in the stage game takes the form:
C D
C c(θ1) c(θ2) −l(θ1) g(θ2)
D g(θ1) −l(θ2) 0 0
where c(·), g(·), l(·) are functions of the type. Each player’s discount factor is
considered as a function its type δ(θ) ∈ [0, 1[. The following prisoners’ dilemma
restrictions are imposed: For all θ ∈ Θ, g(θ) > c(θ) ≥ 0 and l(θ) ≥ 0. Addition-
ally, we assume that higher type players are more cooperative than lower type
players. Formally,
Increasing cooperation attitudes (ICA): The functions c(θ), c(θ)−g(θ), and
δ(θ) are nondecreasing in θ.
We restrict our attention to stationary robust and monotone equilibria, which

















≥ g(θ) + x}
32Information disclosure in adverse selection environments has ambiguous effects. See Levin
(2001) for examples and results.
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whenever the set over which the minimum is taken is nonempty. The map T x is
nondecreasing, and any equilibrium is a fixed point of T̄ x for some x. The charac-
terization and comparative statics results can be proven following the arguments
of Section 3.
The decentralization result also holds in this more general model: By setting
the right price, a social planer can implement the Pareto optimal equilibrium. The
presence of other forms of heterogeneity may make more likely for the monopolist
to implement the optimal equilibrium. Two particular cases are considered.
Case 1: The only source of heterogeneity is g. In other words, c(θ) = c̄





an expression which is decreasing in θe. Consequently the monopolist optimally
sets the Pareto optimal equilibrium: θm = θc.
Case 2: The only source of heterogeneity is δ. In other words, c(θ) = c̄





Just for simplicity, suppose that δ(θ) = θ. The objective function is decreasing in
θ whenever R(θ) = 2(1− θ)− 1−F (θ)
f(θ)
≥ 0. Since R(1) = 0, the last condition will
be met whenever R(θ) is decreasing (a condition that holds, for example, when F
is uniform).
4.2 Expanding the Mark Set
Consider the model introduced in Section 2 but now expand the mark set to
M = {m1, . . . ,mM}. Assume that each player’s mark evolves according to η : M×
M × A → M . At the outset of the game, marks are assigned according to
ψ(θ) ∈ M . The following result shows that there are no benefits from expanding
the mark set.
Proposition 17 Let θc be the Pareto optimal equilibrium defined by Equation
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(3.4). Then, no stationary informationally robust equilibrium of the model with
mark set M can Pareto dominate θc.
This result, whose logic is quite simple, shows us that adding more marks
cannot lead to a Pareto improvement upon the Pareto optimal equilibrium. The
following example shows that it is possible that expanding the mark set may lead
to an increase in total welfare.
Example 18 Consider a two-type model Θ = {θ, θ̄} where both types are equally
likely. Suppose that
0 < θ < (1− δ)g
so that types θ are not willing to cooperate always. We also suppose that θ̄ is
sufficiently large so that those types cooperate when matched. In other terms,
(1− δ)θ̄ + δ1
2
θ̄ ≥ (1− δ)g
Consequently, there is a single equilibrium θc = θ̄ and the expected payoffs of
types θ and θ̄ are 0 and 1
2
θ̄ respectively.
Consider now a three mark model, where the mark set is {Ḡ, G,B}. We
construct an equilibrium so that that when a type θ is matched to a type θ̄, then
the former defects and the latter cooperates; when a type θ is matched to some
other type θ, they cooperate. Marks are assigned so that Ḡ (resp. G) is the mark
for type θ̄ (resp. θ) that conforms to the equilibrium play, and B is the mark of
any player off-the-equilibrium path.










This profile is enforceable whenever −l + δv(θ̄) ≥ 0 and θ + δv(θ) > g. These
conditions can be equivalently stated as
g ≤ 2− δ
1− δ









Our proposed profile cannot Pareto dominates the Pareto optimal equilibrium
of the two type model. However, if l < θ+ g− θ̄, it produces higher total welfare.
To see that all these inequalities may be satisfied, set g = 2, θ̄ = 1, θ = 1/2,
δ = 3/4 and l ≤ 3/5.
4.3 Stability and Contractual Incompleteness
The equilibrium we have described so far is not stable in the following sense: If
some cooperative player defects, then it is marked as noncooperative from then
on. So, if with some positive probability players make mistakes (playing an action
which is not optimal), the aggregate evolution of play in our model will be com-
pletely different from what we have studied. Of course, a way to moderate this
instability property is by considering finite punishments, where a noncooperative
player may become cooperative if it cooperates during a finite number of periods
(this would require a larger mark space). Analyses of this type can be found in
Kandori (1992), and Ellison (1994).
The idea we explore here is rather different. To be more precise, think for
example that what is under stake in each round is whether or not players comply
with a contract. A player comply with the contract if it plays C, and breach the
contract if it plays D. Standard stability analyses focus on the consequences of
players’ mistakes. But under the contractual interpretation, it may be of interest
to study how some degree of contract incompleteness affect equilibrium outcomes.








D g −l 0 0
Here, 1it is a random variable with support {0, 1} which is distributed according
to that P[1it = 0] = ε ∈ [0, 1]. The sequence (1it)i,t is iid. 1it is known to player i
at the beginning of period t. However, 1it is not observable to agents other than
i. In this sense, our setting is an incomplete contract model.
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The purpose is to analyze conditions under which equilibrium outcomes con-
verge to those previously studied as contractual incompleteness disappears (ε →
0).
We again focus on equilibria exhibiting some cooperation. Just to simplify the
exposition, suppose that there is no heterogeneity, and all players have θi = 1. The
full analysis can be found in the Appendix. A necessary and sufficient condition




(1− ε) ≥ g,
for all 1 ∈ {0, 1}. So,
δ ≥ g(1− ε)
1 + g(1− ε)
.
Two things are worth remarking. First, this condition is strictly more stringent
than the standard condition for complete contract games
δ ≥ g − 1
g
. (4.1)
Indeed, as a consequence of incompleteness we need to impose cooperation among
agents even when agents obtain no gains from doing that. Second, as ε→ 0, the
incomplete contract condition does not go to the complete contract one. So, the
kind of stability result we are looking for does not hold. This leaves some room to
improve upon the cooperative stationary equilibrium of the incomplete contracts
model.
Suppose that if an agent defects when its rival cooperates, the former may
clean up its history by paying a fine f ≥ 0. The idea here is to allow agents to
defect when they got a bad shock keeping their history clean. This of course may
make profitable undesirable deviations, namely, an agent defects always and pays
the defection fine to end up with his history clean. So, the defection fine must
be not sufficiently small as to make attractive defection in a bad shock case and
sufficiently big as to make unprofitable dishonest behavior.
We look at an equilibrium where each agent cooperates when 1 = 1, defects
when 1 = 0 and additionally keeps its history clean by paying the defection fine
f if necessary. The equilibrium conditions are
(1− ε)− εl + δv ≥ max{(1− ε)g, (1− ε)(g − f) + δv}
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and
(1− ε)(g − f) + δv ≥ max{(1− ε)g,−εl + δv},
where
v =
(1− ε)2 + ε(1− ε)(g − f − l)
1− δ
is the discounted value of keeping the sheet clean.33 The first condition imposes
cooperation on an agent getting a good shock 1 = 1 while the second one imposes
defection on an agent getting a bad shock 1 = 0 who additionally pay the fine if
the rival cooperated. The equilibrium conditions boil down to
f ∈ [f, f̄ ], δv ≥ max{(1− ε)(g − 1) + εl, (1− ε)f},
with f = g − 1 + ε
1−ε l and f̄ = g +
ε
1−ε l. By putting f = f , we obtain
δ ≥ (1− ε)(g − 1) + εl
(1− ε)2 + ε(1− ε)(g − f − l) + (1− ε)(g − 1) + εl
,
a condition that continuously go to the complete contract condition (4.1) as ε→ 0.
In particular, the introduction of a defection fine may make possible cooperation
in that cooperation is easier to sustain when a suitable defection fine is set. Now,
assuming that collected defection fines are redistributed among agents, the period
payoff of the defection fine model is
πDF (ε) = (1− ε)2 + ε(1− ε)(g − l).
In the model with no defection fine, the period payoff is
πNDF (ε) = (1− ε),
and for all ε > 0, πDF (ε) > πNDF (ε) iff g > l + 1.
The results of this subsection can be summarized as follows. The defection fine
model continuously converges (in the sense that equilibrium actions and payoffs
converge) to the complete contract model. Moreover, as ε→ 0, the defection fine
f → g − 1,
33A player has three alternative: cooperate, defect, defect and pay the defection fine if nec-
essary. The equilibrium conditions impose that one of these three alternatives must be greater
than or equal to the others.
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a defection fine that in the complete contract model makes agents indifferent
between cooperating and paying the fine after defecting. When contracts are
incomplete, the introduction of defection fines that clean up histories of dishonest
behavior may make cooperation possible, even when cooperation is not possible
when no fines are permitted. Yet, when cooperation can be sustained with or
without defection fines, the defection fine setting may be Pareto dominated by
the model with no defection fines.
In some developing countries, there is extensive use of defection fines that
clean up financial histories . In the US, in contrast, those defection fines are not
existent. Since contractual completeness increases with development, the model
provides a simple explanation for this phenomenon. Moreover, Chile –a country
that has grown at 6 % per year in average during the last 2 decades– has recently
abolished defection fines.
5 Concluding Remarks
I have argued that heterogeneity is important when studying game models of large
communities. Based on this observation, this paper offers a repeated game model
of a large community with heterogeneous agents The existence and characteriza-
tion of equilibrium strategies have been studied and comparative statics exercises
have been presented. The stability and decentralization of equilibrium play have
been studied.
Several extensions of the main framework are possible. It is clear that the
studied equilibrium strategies do not carry over to the finite population game.
To see why, note that after a defection the total number of cooperative players
change. As a consequence, the incentives off-the-equilibrium path are altered and
so are therefore the on-the-equilibrium path conditions. By employing the empir-
ical distribution of types (that is, assuming that a central authority may observe
the type of each player and assign marks accordingly), one could use finite but
sufficiently large punishments after a defection. This would require to expand the
mark set, unless we consider 1-period punishment. The finite punishment equi-
librium is sequential for, after a finite number of periods, cooperation is restored
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and the long run distribution of play does not depend on current period play.34
Our analysis depends on the stage game being a prisoners’ dilemma. Exten-
sions to one-sided prisoners’ dilemmas and to other simple two-person games (e.g.
product choice games) are immediate.35 While these games are benchmarks usu-
ally considered, many social interactions are not well modeled by them. Several
equilibrium outcomes may arise. For example, the future reward from coopera-
tion may make possible to minimax players even if the minimax is not a Nash
equilibrium by giving the partners a reward in other matches. To explore this and
other possibilities is left for future research.
6 Appendix
6.1 More General Equilibrium Notions
6.1.1 Nonstationary Equilibrium
Consider the model introduced in Subsection 2.1, but now let us work with a
weaker equilibrium notion. We drop the stationarity and informational robustness
restrictions and stick to the monotonicity and closeness restrictions we worked
with in the main text. We assume that F is continuous.36
Let Pt be the set of G marked players at the outset of period t. We restrict
our attention to equilibria such that, on the play path, Pt is closed and if θ ∈ Pt
is cooperating at round t when faced to a partner in Pt, then so is any player in
Pt with a type θ
′ ≥ θ.
34This argument is set forth by Kandori (1992). One needs to guarantee not only cooperation
among cooperative players but also the off-the-equilibrium restriction that a cooperative defector
is willing to incur the cost of becoming cooperative. See Theorem 2 in Kandori (1992).
35For the prisoners’ dilemma, it is also possible to prove a Folk theorem, where some agents
cooperate –that is, after seeing a sunspot they play according to folk theorem strategies– and
others defect and are defected in each play round. See Okuno-Fujiwara and Postlewaite (1995)
for a treatment.
36It is also assumed that the matching functions (Mt)t≥1 are not observed. In the stationary
model analyzed in the main text, whether or not agents observe the matching functions does
not change the analysis.
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Consider ψ such that ψ(θ) = G if and only if θ ≥ θ0, where θ0 ∈ R is fixed.






i ∈ I | θi ∈ [θt+1,∞[
})
∪Nt
where θt is the smallest type willing to cooperate in round t given that its partner
has a mark G and Nt ⊆ Pt \ [θt,∞[ is the set of players who would have defected
had their partners had a G mark but they keep their good records because their
partners had a B mark. It is evident that Pt+1 ⊆ Pt, and (θt)t≥1 is a nondecreas-
ing sequence which converges, say, to θ∗ ∈ Θ. The random matching assumption
implies that, almost sure in the sequence (Mt)t, P[i ∈ Nt] → 0 for with proba-
bility 1 an agent encounters a player willing to cooperate at some t. This implies
that in the long run, players’ strategies become increasingly robust and, almost
sure, P[Pt+1] = (1 − F (θt)) + P[Nt] → (1 − F (θ∗)). Since equilibrium strategies
are asymptotically informationally robust, θ∗ must satisfy the conditions charac-
terizing a stationary informationally robust equilibrium.
6.1.2 Nonmonotonic Equilibrium
We consider equilibria where the set of cooperative agents P may not be a closed
interval but any closed subset of Θ. For each closed set P ⊆ Θ, define the set
valued map
T x(P e) = {P ⊆ Θ | For all θ ∈ P, θ + δ
1− δ
P(P e) ≥ g + x},
whenever the right hand side is nonempty. Consider the equivalence relation R:
A,B ⊂ Θ, ARB if and only if P[A] = P[B]. Define C as the set of all equivalence
classes ofR, and endow it with the partial order A ≥ B if and only if P[A] ≥ P[B].
So defined, T x : C → 2C is nondecreasing, and so following the main text analysis
it is possible to characterize the equilibrium set.
6.2 The Structure of the Equilibrium Set
6.2.1 Preliminary Results
Proposition 19 The equilibrium set Equil is closed in R.
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Proof: It is immediate from the characterization given in Theorem 3 and the
lower semi-continuity of F (θ−). 2
In the rest of this subsubsection, we assume that F is continuous differentiable
and its derivative f(θ) is (strictly) positive on [a, b]
Proposition 20 Under Monotonicity, Equil is convex.
Proof: Immediate from Theorem 3.2
By means of an example, we show that the equilibrium set may not be convex.
Example 21 Suppose that Θ = [0, 1] and
F (θ) =

0 if θ < 1/3,
6(θ − 1/3) if θ ∈ [1/3, 1/2[,
1/2 if θ ∈ [1/2, 3/4[,
2(θ − 3/4) + 1/2; if θ ∈ [3/4, 1],
with δ = 0.9, g = 3. By using Theorem 3, it is easy to see that the equilibrium
set is
Equil = [0.3, 0.37] ∪ [0.54, 0.86]









while the dashed line is at the level g = 3.
It should be clear that the nonconvexity could also be obtained with a differ-
entiable distribution function whose density is strictly positive on.
6.2.2 Equilibrium Set Cardinality
Now, we investigate generic properties concerning the cardinality of the equilib-
rium set.
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Figure 2: The equilibrium set may not be convex.
To do that, parameterize each model according to its discount factor δ ∈]0, 1[
(so, we fix g, F , and l). As shown in the text, a necessary and sufficient condition
for equilibrium existence is given by Equation (??). So, consider the closed set of
models for which an equilibrium exists:
∆ = {δ ∈]0, 1[| ḡ(δ) ≥ g}.
It is easy to see that ∆ must be an interval. Endow ∆ with the Lebesgue measure.
Theorem 22 Suppose that F is continuous. Then, generically in ∆, the set of
equilibria is a continuum.
It is useful to state the following lemma.
Lemma 23 Suppose that ḡ(δ) > g. Then, the set of equilibria is a continuum.
Proof: The function θ
(
1 + δ
1−δ (1− F (θ))
)
is continuous in θ. Therefore, there






> g. So, [θ1, θ2] ⊆ Equil and so Equil must be a continuum.2
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1−δ (1 − F (θ))
)
is continuous in (θ, δ) and so we can apply the maximum
theorem. Moreover, ḡ(·) is strictly increasing on ∆. The result follows.2
6.3 Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. Let p be the probability mass of P . The only interesting
case is p > 0. If (C,D) is the outcome of a cooperative-noncooperative match,
then the stationary equilibrium restrictions imply that
−l + δvG(θ) ≥ 0 + δvB,
where vG(θ) =
pθ−l(1−p)
1−δ is the total expected payoff when type θ is cooperative
and and vB =
pg
1−δ is what a player would obtain if marked as noncooperative.
Note that in this case, it must be the case that η(G,B,C) = G for otherwise




(1− δ) + δ(1− p)
)
≥ δp(g − θ)
which is a contradiction for θ < g and l ≥ 0. 2
Proof of Lemma 2. Note that for x ∈ [0, x̄], θ ∈ Θx. Indeed, 1 − F (θ−) =











≥ g + x.








≥ g + x,
so that the optimization problem defining T x is nonempty. Additionally, note
that the function θ+ δv(θ, θe) is continuous in θ. Therefore T x(θe) = min{θ ∈ Θ |
θ + δv(θ, θe) ≥ g + x} ∈ Θ, and T x(θe) is well defined.
Now, let us prove that T x is nondecreasing. The restriction of T x to Θx, T x|Θx ,
is nondecreasing. Indeed, by increasing θe the feasible set in the minimization
problem defining T x(θe) (weakly) shrinks. So, the increase of θe leads to a weak
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increase in T x(θe). It is further clear that for any θe > θ̄x, T x(θe) = θ̄ ≥ T x(θ̄x).
This completes the proof. 2
Proof of Theorem 3. To see the characterization part, note that any equi-
















= g + x.









= g + x.
This implies that all types greater than or equal to θe are willing to cooperate
when so does θe.
Let us now prove the second characterization. Suppose that θe ∈ Equil. Then
from the first characterization, it must exist a fixed point θe of T x, for some x,


















≥ g + x.
It readily follows that T x(θe) = θe and θe ∈ Θx. The result follows.
The existence part is immediate.2
Proof of Corollary 6. Suppose that θe ∈ Bx ∩ Θx for x ≥ 0. Note that
T 0(θ) ≤ T x(θ) for all θ. Then, from Proposition 5 there must be a fixed point
θ ≤ θe of the map T 0. But Θx ≤ Θ0 (in the strong set order) and Θx ⊆ Θ0. So
θ ∈ Θ0. We have proven that for any equilibrium θe we can find a fixed point θ
of T 0 (which happens to be equilibrium) and such that θ ≤ θe. Therefore,
min{θe ∈ Θ | θe ∈ Equil} ≥ min{θ ∈ Θ | T 0(θ) = θ},
which completes the proof.2
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Proof of Corollary 7. It is immediate from Proposition 5. 2
Proof of Proposition 13. We need to prove that
θc(1− F (θc−))
1− δ













a condition that is met. Note that this condition is also sufficient for, by fixing any
price as the one described above, it is easy to see that the incentive constraints
are satisfied.2
Proof of Proposition 14: The monopoly problem can be written as











ϕ′(θe) = 1− δ
1− δ
f(θe)(Φ(θe)− θe)







which is negative if and only if Φ(θe) = 2θe − 1−F (θ
e)
f(θe)
is positive. Since Φ(θe)
is nondecreasing as a consequence of Monotonicity, θc is the monopoly problem
solution if and only if
Φ(θc) ≥ 0.
Define θ̂ as the biggest solution to
max{ϕ(θ) | θ ∈ [0, 1]}.
Let us prove that θ∗ ≤ θ̂. To do that, it is enough to prove that the function







) + (1− α) log(θ(1− F (θ))2)
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(1− F (θ)))− 2 log((1− F (θ))),
so the result will obtain if the derivative of this function with respect to F (θ) is







1−δ (1− F (θ))




(1− F (θ)) ≥ 0.
It follows that for any g ∈ [g(δ), ḡ(δ)], the monopoly solution is θm = θc. If not,
θc < θm.




















This problem is concave and so θδ is the only solution to the necessary and suffi-




It is therefore clear that any converging sequence θδn must converge to θ1, where



























θδ − θ∗ + δ
1−δ (θ
δ(1− F (θδ))− θ∗(1− F (θ∗)))








This completes the proof. 2
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